Historical demography. Understanding temporal change, individual variation and regional persistence by Kok, J.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/129228
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2018-07-07 and may be subject to
change.
VOL. 11, NO. 2, 2014 237 
 Historical Demography
Understanding Temporal Change, Individual Variation and Regional 
Persistence 
 Jan Kok 
 Abstract 
 This chapter links recent Dutch and Belgian research in historical demography 
to on-going debates and emerging trends in the fi eld at large. It starts with 
the perennial – but always fascinating – discussion on how to make sense of 
the demographic transition, an extremely complex subject. The discussion is 
currently moving to the wild fl uctuations in fertility in the twentieth century, 
as well as to other changes known as the ‘Second Demographic Transition’. 
Following this, I discuss how historical demographers are making sense of 
the huge individual variations they uncover in demographic behaviour – 
including family composition, religion, social class and locality. One strategy 
is to compare and thus control for context in comparative research designs. 
Another is to try to locate ‘universal’ elements in demographic behaviour, such 
as transmitted physiological components. Finally, I show how the concept of 
long-term traditional, macro-regional family systems is being put to use in 
contemporary research. 
Keywords: historical demography, demographic transition, family systems, fertility
 Introduction 
 Demography, and by implication historical demography, is a highly empiri-
cal discipline dedicated to the study of vital events. It searches for the causes 
and implications of (changes in) fertility, family formation, migration and 
mortality. In doing so, issues of time and timing are always of paramount 
importance. Understanding the timing of life events requires knowledge of 
processes operating on very diffferent time scales: physiological rhythms and 
cycles, nature’s seasons, economic conjuncture, family dynamics, and the 
 longue durée of culture, customs and law. To the  longue durée , one can add 
the genetic make-up of human beings as well as universal traits acquired 
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during millennia of evolution. Not surprisingly, many of the debates in 
historical demography revolve around conflicting interpretations of the 
nature of behavioural change. Disentangling the complex nexus of vari-
ous processes of long and short duration will remain the core business of 
(historical) demography in the foreseeable future. Understanding change 
over time requires insight into the variability of demographic behaviour. 
How can we interpret demographic variation across individuals and groups, 
and what is the ‘bottom line’ of universal behaviour?  
 In this chapter, I present research (mostly from the last decade) and 
major debates from three fĳields of historical demographic research. The fĳirst 
is the ongoing quest to understand the demographic transition, the most 
important topic in historical demography. How did the global shift towards 
lower mortality and fertility rates take place? What motivated couples to 
limit their family size and what social processes triggered changes in mo-
tivation? Is there a connection to the other major transition, the industrial 
revolution? I incorporate all these and many other questions under the 
heading ‘understanding temporal change’.  
 The second fĳ ield can be titled ‘understanding individual variation’. In 
the past decades, historical demographers have invested a great deal of 
energy in collecting information on individuals and households, and this 
micro-level data has yielded abundant evidence of temporal, local, social 
and religious variations in behaviour. The great challenge is to reconcile 
this variability with inherited aspects of behaviour. Vital events need to be 
broken down into their various constituent elements. An example is infant 
mortality: historical demographers aim to fĳind out to what extent the deaths 
of children in a given family can be ascribed to transmitted factors (genes, 
child rearing practices learned by the mother, etc.), the current situation 
of the family (crowded household, low income, poor housing, etc.), the 
environment (infectious diseases) or the socio-cultural group (receptive 
to medical advice to a greater or lesser extent).  
 Finally, I focus on macro-regional research. Notwithstanding enormous 
local diversity, people in broadly-defĳined regions often share basic attitudes 
towards family relationships, inheritance, kin co-residence and the position 
of women. Recently, interest has intensifĳ ied in regional marriage patterns 
and – more encompassing – regional ‘family systems’. The question of the 
origin and nature of persistent regional characteristics is not only of purely 
academic interest. It is directly geared to the question of whether the regions 
of the world will converge towards the same demographic model, or whether 
this convergence will be delayed or not occur at all (for instance because of 
the persistence of old, regional family systems). Obviously, many types of 
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demographic forecasting and policymaking hinge on the outcome of this 
convergence-divergence debate. 
 Clearly, within the limited space allotted to this chapter, the broad fĳields 
sketched above cannot possibly be dealt with exhaustively. My aim is to 
discuss selected ongoing debates, where possible highlighting research 
on the Low Countries, within the three fĳ ields. Therefore, other topics in 
historical demography, such as migration, are ignored. In addition, these 
fĳ ields of research generally focus on the period after 1850. This stems from 
the urgency to explain relatively recent changes in society, the intense 
co-operation with the social sciences and developments in digital data 
collection, which are prominent for the period from 1850 to 1940. Accord-
ingly, historiography on the period before 1850 is largely ignored. For a more 
comprehensive overview of the past progress of historical demography in 
the Low Countries, the reader is directed elsewhere. 1 
 Understanding temporal change  
 Human fertility and mortality have always been subject to strong variation 
between families, regions and periods. However, during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries a global shift occurred from generally high levels of 
fertility and mortality to lower levels. This shift began in Western Europe 
and has now reached virtually all parts of the world. Because of its universal 
and irreversible character, this change of demographic behaviour has been 
termed the First Demographic Transition. Historical demography has 
undertaken the mission to describe and explain this transition.  
 Initially, this seemed a relatively straightforward task. As formulated 
in the 1950s and 1960s, classical transition theory assumed that industri-
alisation, the expansion of education and increasing urbanisation would 
lead to smaller families everywhere, a development that occurred fĳ irst in 
the Western world. In the process, the Malthusian ‘homeostatic regime’, 
in which population growth was held in check by limited resources, was 
replaced by a new, stable system of both low fertility and low mortality rates. 
The Princeton European Fertility Project, a large collaborative project led by 
Ansley Coale, began in 1963 to chart the transition by relating demographic 
rates of European provinces to socio-economic developments in the period 
from 1870 to 1960. In the project, marital fertility was contrasted with the 
1 Theo Engelen and Ad van der Woude†, ‘Historical Demography in the Netherlands’, and I. 
Devos and C. Matthys, ‘A history of historical demography in Belgium’ in: A. Fauve-Chamoux, 
I. Bolovan and S. Sogner (eds.), A global history of historical demography (Bern forthcoming).
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‘natural fertility’ of the Hutterites (an orthodox religious minority group in 
North America who did not practice birth control), in order to detect the 
onset and extent of deliberate fertility control. 2 However, the outcomes of 
the project seemed to refute the tenets of classical theory: at the level of 
provinces, the causal links between fertility decline with mortality decline 
and economic change was weak, but there appeared to be a strong associa-
tion with religious, linguistic and ethnic diffferences. Fertility decline took 
place along cultural dividing lines, whereas socio-economic diffferentials 
seemed to play a limited role at best. Thus, instead of an adaptation to 
changed economic conditions, fertility decline came to be interpreted in 
cultural terms and to be seen as a difffusion of innovative behaviour. This 
difffusion was accelerated by secularisation. 
 Dutch demographers faced the challenge of having to explain two 
conspicuous features of demographic change in their country. First, the 
onset of the transition had a marked regional pattern, with the northwest 
parts of the country being the fĳirst to demonstrate change and the southeast 
parts the last. Second, within Western Europe the Netherlands as a whole 
was a latecomer, characterised by relatively high fertility levels until the 
1960s. Initially, the explanation followed classic modernisation discourse. 
The Dutch leading demographer E.W. Hofstee explained the changes as 
stemming from the demise of the traditional ‘agrarian-artisanal’ marriage 
pattern, in which fertility was held in check by late marriage, as household 
formation was contingent on inheriting a farm or workshop. The spread 
of wage labour would lead to an ‘intermediate’ period of earlier marriages 
and high fertility, until people adopted modern birth control techniques 
to limit family size. 3 Their willingness to do so presupposed an attitude of 
self-determination, which in Hofstee’s view was part of modern culture 
that fĳ irst emerged in the North and West, and spread gradually across the 
country. His model was not very convincing, either empirically or theo-
retically. According to two of his opponents, F. van Heek and J.D. Buissink, 
the regional pattern in Dutch fertility decline could best be explained 
by the predominance of Roman Catholics in the South, in combination 
with the Catholic opposition to birth control. 4 Hofstee argued that because 
2 Ansley J. Coale and Susan Cotts Watkins (eds.),  The Decline of Fertility in Europe  (Princeton 
1986).
3 Evert W. Hofstee, ‘Regionale verscheidenheid in de ontwikkeling van het aantal geboorten 
in Nederland in de 2 de  helft van de 19 de eeuw’,  Akademiedagen VII (1954) 59-100. A good overview 
of the debate is given in Theo Engelen,  Van 2 naar 16 miljoen mensen. Demografĳie van Nederland, 
1800-nu (Meppel 2009).
4 F. van Heek, Het geboorte-niveau der Nederlandse Rooms-Katholieken. Een demografĳ isch-
sociologische studie van een geëmancipeerde minderheidsgroep (Leiden 1954); J.D. Buissink, 
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the fertility levels of Catholics difffered across regions, religion played a 
minor role. However, Hofstee recognised the vital importance of religion 
to explain why the Netherlands difffered from neighbouring countries. 
In his view, ‘organised confessionalism’ (synonymous with pillarisation) 
led to a strong emphasis on morality and sexual propriety, even among 
non-religious groups (‘asymmetric tolerance’), and thus a relatively strong 
resistance to ‘immoral’ birth control techniques. 5 
 In subsequent research, scholars have tried to solve the debate by weigh-
ing the relative contributions to fertility decline of social and economic 
‘modernisation’ on the one hand and religion on the other. First, O. Boonstra 
and A. van der Woude showed that whereas religious denomination ex-
plained much of the synchronous variation between communities, change 
over time was better explained by socio-economic variables. 6 Second, 
T.L.M. Engelen and J.H.A. Hillebrand tried to combine both elements in 
a ‘motivation-acceptation’ model. Motivation comes from the realisation 
that having fewer children brings economic benefĳ its, coupled with the 
awareness that declining infant mortality implies fewer births are necessary 
to reach a target family size. The acceptance of deliberate birth control can 
be slowed down by religious inhibitions, however, over time this ‘fĳ ilter’ 
becomes weaker, leading to a more direct impact of economic factors on 
fertility decisions. Engelen and Hillebrand’s model proved successful in 
explaining developments in respectively the provinces of Limburg, 7 and 
Utrecht and Groningen. 8 Recently, H. Knippenberg and S. de Vos confĳirmed 
the value of the model for the entire Netherlands, but they also argued that 
religion deserves an even more prominent place. Dutch pillarisation implies 
that a popular attachment to churches (especially among those who sided 
with political emancipation movements), efffective control mechanisms 
by these churches, and pronatalist tendencies, all led to strong efffects on 
sexuality and fertility. 9 Knippenberg and de Vos argued that the diffferent 
 De analyse van regionale verschillen in de huwelijksvruchtbaarheid (Delft 1970).
5 E.W. Hofstee,  Korte demografĳische geschiedenis van Nederland van 1800 tot heden (Haarlem 
1981).
6 O. Boonstra and A. van der Woude, ‘Demographic transition in the Netherlands. A statistical 
analysis of regional diffferences in the level and development of the birth rate and of fertility, 
1850-1900’,  AAG Bijdragen  24 (1984) 1-57.
7 T.L.M. Engelen,  Fertiliteit, arbeid, mentaliteit: de vruchtbaarheidsdaling in Nederlands-
Limburg, 1850-1960  (Assen/Maastricht 1987).
8 J.H.A. Hillebrand,  Van motivatie naar acceptatie. De vruchtbaarheidsdaling in Groningen 
en Utrecht (Nijmegen 1991).
9 Hans Knippenberg and Sjoerd de Vos, ‘Tussen crisis en verzuiling: regionale verschillen 
in vruchtbaarheid in Nederland tijdens het interbellum’, in: Jan Kok and Jan van Bavel (eds.), 
 De levenskracht der bevolking. Sociale en demografĳische kwesties in de Lage Landen tijdens het 
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speed of dismantling of the ‘pillars’ (and even re-pillarisation in the case of 
evangelical and orthodox Protestantism) led to marked shifts in the regional 
pattern of fertility. In the 1960s, the Roman Catholic ‘pillar’ broke down very 
fast, leading to very low fertility in the South. 10 Although these fĳindings seem 
to vindicate the position of van Heek and Buissink, other researchers have 
claimed that socio-economic factors still warrant closer inspection. P. Klep 
connected fertility decline to the post-war demise of small family farms in 
the sandy regions. Once children realised there was no longer a family fund 
on which they could lay a claim, they were liberated from parental control 
and restrictions on marrying. 11 In addition, J. Schellekens and F. van Poppel 
have recently concluded that Dutch fertility decline can be explained in 
the most part by mortality decline, rising real wages and unemployment. 12 
 Individual motivations to adopt or refrain from birth control are just one 
part of the story. Another part is formed by the social dynamics that explain 
how, in some groups or regions, new behaviour spread faster than in others. 
Following the European Fertility Project, difffusion theory has become 
the dominant paradigm. 13 The dynamics of difffusion can be perceived as 
social learning (the flow of information between individuals), but also as 
social influence (competition with others, emulating social superiors, and 
social coercion). Surprisingly few studies have really tried to trace how 
behavioural change was copied by one group from another. In the Neth-
erlands, Hillebrand showed the importance of dialect groups – and thus 
shared culture – in Groningen province. 14 In his study on fertility decline 
in Leuven, J. van Bavel showed that Flemish couples living in neighbour-
interbellum (Leuven 2010) 109-140; Hans Knippenberg and Sjoerd de Vos, ‘Een opmerkelijke 
omslag: het veranderde geografĳ ische patroon van de huwelijksvruchtbaarheid in Nederland 
tijdens de culturele revolutie van de jaren zestig en zeventig’, in: Koen Matthijs, Bart Van de Putte, 
Jan Kok and Hilde Bras (eds.),  Leven in de Lage Landen. Historisch-demografĳisch onderzoek in 
Vlaanderen en Nederland (Leuven 2010) 187-209. See also Kevin McQuillan, ‘When Does Religion 
Influence Fertility?’,  Population and Development Review ( PDR ) 30 (2004) 25-56.
10 Marloes Schoonheim,  Mixing ovaries and rosaries. Catholic religion and reproduction in the 
Netherlands, 1870-1970 (Amsterdam 2005).
11 Paul M.M. Klep, ‘Kleine boeren en grote gezinnen in crisistijd (1920-1970) – een nieuwe these’, 
in: Jan Kok and Jan van Bavel (eds.),  De levenskracht der bevolking. Sociale en demografĳische 
kwesties in de Lage Landen tijdens het interbellum (Leuven 2010) 141-196; Paul M.M. Klep,  Gezins-
solidariteit en rotten kids. Schaarste, seks en het vierde gebod op het platteland in Nederland in de 
twintigste eeuw  (Nijmegen 2011).
12 Jona Schellekens and Frans van Poppel, ‘Marital fertility decline in the Netherlands: child 
mortality, real wages, and unemployment, 1860-1939’,  Demography  49 (2012) 965-988.
13 John B. Casterline, ‘Difffusion Processes and Fertility Transition: Introduction’, in: John B. 
Casterline (ed.),  Difffusion Processes and fertility transition. Selected perspectives (Washington 
2001) 1-38.
14 Hillebrand,  Van motivatie naar acceptatie .
TSEG2014.2.indd   242 24-06-14   10:52
243 
HISTORICAL DEMOGRAPHY
KOK
hoods with Walloons stopped having children earlier than in non-mixed 
neighbourhoods. 15 Research on the paths of difffusion includes the work 
of C. Matthys, who tested the hypothesis that Flemish rural girls working 
in urban, bourgeois households gained knowledge of limiting family size 
and brought that to their own marriages. 16 However, this role of employers 
was not confĳirmed and Matthys suggests that instead, servant girls were 
influenced more by neighbours, family and friends. She concluded that 
social learning might have been less important than other types of social 
influence, such as social coercion. In her recent book on four Dutch cities, 
A. Janssens also looked at the workplace, in particular the factory f loor, 
as the locus of exchange of knowledge on birth control practices. 17 Other 
researchers have studied the extent to which the fertility behaviour of 
migrants (for instance to Charleroi or Antwerp) was influenced by their new 
neighbours, or vice versa. Of course, there is a need to separate potential 
difffusion efffects from other aspects of migration that might afffect couples’ 
fertility decisions (for instance difffĳ iculties in adjusting to new surroundings 
and the selection efffects of migration). 18 
 Apart from the difffĳ iculties in locating and proving the difffusion of in-
novative behaviour, the notions of both ‘innovation’ and ‘transition’ have 
recently come under attack. I fĳ irst examine the innovative character of 
birth control. According to many authors, populations have always been 
able to control the number of their offfspring and what changed during the 
nineteenth century was initially the  intensity of control and only later the 
methods. 19 Ethnographers have for a long time documented the contra-
15 Jan van Bavel, ‘Difffusion efffects in the European fertility transition: Historical evidence 
from within a Belgian town (1846-1910)’,  European Journal of Population 20 (2004) 63-85.
16 Christa Mattys, ‘Domestic servants and difffusion of fertility control in Flanders’,  History 
of the Family. An International Quarterly 18 (2013) 456-480; Christa Matthys, Sex and the city. 
Servants and the difffusion of fertility control in Flanders, 1830-1930. (Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, Ghent University (Ghent 2012).
17 Angélique Janssens,  Labouring Lives. Women, work and family formation in the Netherlands, 
1880-1960 (Bern 2014).
18 Thierry Eggerickx, ‘The fertility decline in the industrial area of Charleroi during the second 
half of the nineteenth century. Did sedentary and migrant people have a diffferent behaviour?’, 
 Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis ‒ Revue belge d’histoire contemporaine  9  (2001) 
403-429; Reto Schumacher, Koen Matthijs and Sarah Moreels, Migration and reproduction in 
an urbanizing context. A sequence analysis of family life courses in 19 th century Antwerp and 
Geneva. Working Paper of the Scientifĳ ic Research Community Historical Demography WOG/
HD/ 2012-17 . 
19 Simon Szreter,  Fertility, Class and Gender in Britain, 1860-1940 (Cambridge 1996); Jan 
van Bavel, ‘Deliberate birth spacing before the fertility transition in Europe: evidence from 
nineteenth-century Belgium’,  Population Studies 58(2004) 95-107; Jan van Bavel, ‘Birth spacing 
as a family strategy. Evidence from 19th century Leuven, Belgium’,  The History of the Family: An 
TSEG2014.2.indd   243 24-06-14   10:52
244
TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR SOCIALE EN ECONOMISCHE GESCHIEDENIS
VOL. 11, NO. 2, 2014
ceptive methods employed in non-Western societies. Recently, historical 
demographers have demonstrated that conscious birth spacing, for instance 
due to expected increases in food prices, was practiced by pre-transition 
European populations. 20 Birth spacing intensifĳ ied during the fĳ irst stage of 
the fertility decline, for example through protracted breastfeeding. Even in 
the twentieth century, traditional contraceptive methods such as absten-
tion and withdrawal remained the most important techniques for married 
couples, at least in England. 21  
 The notion of a transition from one ‘stable’ situation to another has 
been put into perspective. Notable fluctuations in fertility occurred both 
before and after the transition. In fact, in no way can twentieth-century 
demography be described in terms of a ‘stable demographic regime’. First, 
in the inter-war period many Western countries had already experienced 
levels of fertility lower than necessary to maintain population levels. With 
hindsight, low fertility in this period has been interpreted as the efffects of 
unemployment and looming war, but contemporary commentators were 
blaming the remarkable increase of childless or one-child families on chang-
ing life styles. Many couples were hesitant to give up newly-won luxuries 
and holidays, and supposedly decided to have no or few children. 22 At the 
time, most demographers expected low fertility to last, and therefore the 
‘baby boom’ came as a great surprise. Contrary to what is often assumed, 
the boom was not simply related to catching-up efffects because family 
formation had been delayed by the Second World War. In fact, in many 
countries the upward trend in fertility was already apparent in the late 
1930s or early 1940s. Moreover, the baby boom also occurred in neutral 
countries such as Portugal and Sweden. So far, no convincing explanation 
has been offfered for this remarkable turn of events. A likely prime candidate 
is the ‘opportunity costs’ of children for women. Post-war wages rose faster 
International Quarterly 8 (2003) 585-604; Josef Ehmer, ‘The signifĳ icance of looking back: fertility 
before the ‘fertility decline’,  Historical Social Research 36 (2011) 11-34.
20 Tommy Bengtsson and Martin Dribe, ‘Deliberate control in a natural fertility population: 
Southern Sweden, 1766-1864’,  Demography, 43 (2006) 727-746; Martin Dribe and Francesco 
Scalone, ‘Detecting Deliberate Fertility Control in Pre-transitional Populations: Evidence from 
six German villages, 1766-1863’,  European Journal of Population 26 (2010) 411-434.
21 Simon Szreter and Kate Fisher,  Sex before the sexual revolution. Intimate life in England 
1918-1963  (Cambridge 2010). For Flanders, see Christa Mattys and Isabelle Devos, ‘”Gij doet uw 
plichten niet, man?” De houding van mannen ten opzichte van seksualiteit en geboortebeperking 
in Vlaanderen, 1900-1940’, Working Paper 2012-2,EED Working Paper Series, Universiteit Gent.
22 For an overview, see Jan van Bavel, ‘Subreplacement fertility in the West before the baby 
boom: past and current perspectives’ , Population Studies 64 (2010) 1-18; for The Netherlands, 
Jan van Bavel and Jan Kok, ‘Pioneers of the Modern Lifestyle? Childless Couples in the Early 
Twentieth-Century Netherlands’,  Social Science History 34 (2010) 47-72.
TSEG2014.2.indd   244 24-06-14   10:52
245 
HISTORICAL DEMOGRAPHY
KOK
for men than for women, enlarging the gender gap, which stimulated the 
‘bread-winner model’ of women staying at home with children. Further, 
work opportunities for young women deteriorated compared with those 
for older women, who found work during the war and held on to their 
jobs afterwards. Their retirement in the 1960s fĳ inally expanded the op-
portunities for younger women and heightened the opportunity costs of 
children. There are various other explanations, all awaiting a more careful 
examination on the basis of micro-level data. 23 
 The ensuing ‘baby bust’ of the 1970s and after is generally seen as an in-
tegral element of the sweeping changes in marriage and the family, labelled 
as the Second Demographic Transition. According to many inf luential 
demographers, the past decades have produced nothing short of a revolution 
in demographic behaviour, the outcome of which is still highly uncertain. 
The cause is believed to be a change in the value structure of Western, 
and increasingly also non-Western, societies. The rise in the standard of 
living reached in the 1960s and after has, basically for the fĳ irst time in 
human history, created the opportunity to fulfĳ il ‘postmaterialist’ needs. 
These needs are recognition, freedom of expression and self-fulfĳ ilment. 24 
According to the theory, self-fulfĳ ilment implies in general a weaker com-
mitment to lasting relationships, leading to a delay in family formation, an 
increase in living alone and an increase in divorce rates. It is also reflected 
in cohabitation and in having fewer children. According to R. Lesthaeghe 
and other demographers, this is a virtual new transition, not just the next 
stage of the First Demographic Transition. They argue that whereas the 
First Transition was triggered by the desire to give (a smaller number of) 
children better opportunities, the Second Transition is solely the result of 
self-fulfĳilment. However, there appears to be a continuity in the clustering of 
the forerunner regions between the First and Second Demographic Transi-
tions, suggesting the persistence and predominance of cultural factors (in 
particular secularisation) underlying behavioural change. 25  
 The notion of the Second Demographic Transition is hotly debated. 
Doubts have been raised about the universal, uniform and irreversible 
23 Jan van Bavel and David Reher, ’The baby boom and its causes: what we know and what we 
need to know’,  PDR 39 (2013) 257-288.
24 Ron Lesthaeghe, ‘The unfolding story of the second demographic transition’,  PDR 36 (2010) 
211-251; Dirk J. van de Kaa, ‘Postmodern fertility preferences: From changing value orientations 
to new behavior’, in: Rodolfo A. Bulatao and John B. Casterline (eds.),  Global fertility transition 
 (New York 2001) 290-331.
25 Ron Lesthaeghe and Karel Neels,  ‘From the fĳ irst to the second demographic transition: 
an interpretation of the spatial continuity of demographic innovation in France, Belgium and 
Switzerland’,  European Journal of Population 18 (2002) 325-360.
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character of the changes, and especially about the dominant role of idea-
tional factors. 26 For instance, the notion that self-fulfĳ ilment leads to (very) 
low fertility has been criticised now that fertility is rising again in the 
Scandinavian countries that were forerunners in the Second Demographic 
Transition, as well as in several other European countries. 27 Other research-
ers have demonstrated that the spread of cohabitation and extra-marital 
births in Eastern Europe is not so much the result of ‘post-materialist’ 
self-fulfĳ ilment, but results from the problems faced by an impoverished 
rural population after the fall of Communism. 28 
 In fact, doubts have also been raised about the ‘transitional’ (in the 
sense of being unique, universal and irreversible) character of the First 
Demographic Transition. According to S. Szreter, the transition discourse 
has to be placed alongside other modernisation models that were con-
structed in the 1960s, but which were basically a reflection and backward 
projection of the characteristics of (American) society of the time. In the 
1960s, rational family planning had become the norm, which was made 
efffective by new techniques such as the pre-lubricated condom and the pill. 
Szreter asserts that the contemporary small-family norm was then projected 
onto the historical development of fertility decline. This meant a search 
for ‘modern’ elements in the past, which supposedly caused the decline of 
fertility in the period after 1860. Szreter calls this ‘an unwarranted, arbitrary 
and a-historical imposition’ and a clear example of a teleological ‘Whig 
interpretation of history’. 29 In his view, people have always adjusted their 
fertility in response to the examples of large or small families surrounding 
them. Such examples were many, simply because of biological variation 
in human fertility. What is crucial is a shift towards the perception that 
having fewer children brings more advantages. Where, when and to what 
extent this shift took placed depended very much on local factors and 
historical contingency. A central question in Szreter’s research is how refer-
ence groups or ‘communicating communities’ are constituted. In England, 
people were inf luenced greatly by class and interpersonal relations on 
the work floor. Moreover, gender relations (including the possibilities for 
26 Simon Szreter, ’Theories and heuristics: how best to approach the study of historic fertility 
declines?’  Historical Social Research 36 (2011) 65-98, in particular 72,77.
27 David Coleman, ‘Why we don’t have to believe without doubting in the “Second Demographic 
Transition” –some agnostic comments’,  Vienna Yearbook of Population Research ( 2004) 11 – 24; 
see also  http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/03-second-demographic-transition-new-forms-family-slides-
document .
28 Traian Rotariu, ‘A few critical remarks on the culturalist theories on fertility with special 
view on Romania’s situation’,  Romanian Journal of Population Studies  3 (2009) 11-32.
29 Szreter, ‘Theories and heuristics’, 75 and 66.
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husbands and wives to negotiate sexuality and birth control) also varied 
by social groups and local communities (for instance mining versus textile 
towns). 30 However, in other areas and periods the ‘communicating com-
munities’ in which people determine the benefĳits of having children may 
have a diffferent nature, for example they could be religious groups. 31 Thus, 
according to Szreter there has not been a single transition, but instead 
‘many geographically and chronologically disparate processes occurring 
in distinct contexts and for diffferent reasons’. 32 Historians should try to 
learn from the diffferences between these processes, and not ‘attempt to 
impose a grid of similarity’. 33 
 For Szreter, the costs and benefĳits of a large or small family size – as 
they are perceived within communicating communities – are key to 
whether change occurred. His approach might be combined with one that 
emphasises the competitive social environment in which families try to 
realise ‘reproductive success’. The central question is: when and how did 
the content of ‘success’ change from having a large number of children 
to having a small number of better-supported children? In this respect, 
the recent research of N. Cummins is of interest. 34 His approach has an 
evolutionary element, in that it builds on the notion that humans have 
evolved to strive for economic and social success. 35 In traditional societies, 
this often translated into large families, as having many children added to 
the family’s power base and the cost of raising children was spread between 
the extended kin. However, economic modernisation resulted in more 
 opportunity for economic and social success, in the meantime breaking 
down the traditional kinship networks. This breakdown meant that the 
costs of having children shifted more and more to the parents alone. Once 
some parents started to concentrate their resources on small numbers 
of children, other parents had to do the same if their offfspring were to 
30 Szreter,  Fertility, Class and Gender . Also, S. Pooley, Parenthood, child-rearing and fertility 
in England, 1850-1914,  The History of the Family , 18 (2013) 83-106.
31 Szreter, ‘Theories and heuristics’, 85.
32 Szreter,  Fertility, class and gender , 364, cited in Mikolaj Szołtysek, ‘Science without Laws? 
Model Building, Micro Histories and the Fate of the Theory of Fertility Decline’,  Historical Social 
Research 32 (2007) 10-41, in particular 27.
33 Szreter, ‘Theories and heuristics’, 69.
34 Neil J. Cummins, Why Did Fertility Decline? An Analysis of the Individual Level Economic 
Correlates of the Nineteenth Century Fertility Transition in England and France. PhD Thesis 
London School of Economics (London 2009); Neil J. Cummins, ‘ Marital fertility and wealth during 
the fertility transition: rural France, 1750-1850 ’ ,  The Economic History Review 66 (2013) 449-476.
35 Also Kevin MacDonald, ‘An evolutionary perspective on human fertility’,  PDR 21 (1999) 223-
246; Bobbi S. Low,  Why sex matters. A Darwinian look at human behavior (Oxford and Princeton 
2000) 144-145.
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be socially competitive. This is why the fertility transition bears all the 
characteristics of an innovation difffusion, but the social dynamics involved 
are much more important than the actual ‘innovation’. Cummins applied his 
model to the fertility declines of France and England, which so clearly defĳied 
easy associations with the industrial revolution. He showed that the decline 
in fertility started much earlier in France because there the  opportunity 
for status advancement through smaller families was present much earlier 
than in England. At present, his social mobility model seems best suited 
to explain the role of forerunners in the fertility decline. However, to date 
empirical evidence is limited. Some examples from the Low Countries 
include the work of Van Bavel, who has shown that for Leuven, children from 
large families had higher odds of ending up in a lower class and lower odds of 
upward mobility. He concluded: ‘Fertility can be expected to decline when 
society evolves in such a way that lower fertility enhances the probability 
that children climb the social ladder, assuming that there would be an 
evolved motive disposition for upward mobility’. 36 Recently, Bras et al. have 
shown that in the Netherlands during the nineteenth century the negative 
relation between family size and social status of the children (measured at 
the time of their marriage) became stronger. 37 
 What has become clear from this brief overview is that alternative 
interpretations of temporal change in demographic behaviour are abundant 
and we are still a long way from a comprehensive interpretation of the 
demographic transition, if this is even possible. However, this makes for a 
fascinating and vibrant fĳ ield of research. 
 Understanding individual variation 
 Until well into the 1980s, historical demography was focused on mapping 
and contrasting regionally aggregated data, in order to understand the 
epidemiological and fertility transitions of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Since then, the availability of new data sources and the develop-
36 Jan van Bavel, ‘The efffect of fertility limitation on intergenerational social mobility: the 
quality-quantity trade-offf during the demographic transition’,  Journal of Biosocial Science , 38 
(2006) 553-569, in particular 567. See also Jan van Bavel, Sarah Moreels, Bart van de Putte and 
Koen Matthijs, ‘Family size and intergenerational social mobility during the fertility transi-
tion. Evidence of resource dilution from the city of Antwerp in nineteenth century Belgium’, 
 Demographic Research , 24 (2011) 313-344.
37 Hilde Bras, Jan Kok and Kees Mandemakers, ‘Sibship Size and Status Attainment across 
Contexts: Evidence from the Netherlands, 1840-1925’,  Demographic Research 23 (2010) 73-104, 
96.
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ment of appropriate analytical techniques have allowed a shift of research 
focus to individuals and households. A pioneering role in this regard has 
been played by the Historical Sample of the Netherlands (HSN), which 
since the early 1990s has been based at the International Institute of Social 
History. In this project, the life courses of about 80,000 randomly sampled 
people are being reconstructed, by linking civil records (certifĳ icates of birth, 
marriage and death) to the population registers. The (publicly accessible) 
database has proved an invaluable resource for studies into social mobility, 
marriage, migration, (infant) mortality and household composition. 38 So far, 
more than three hundred scholarly publications have been based on HSN 
data. In Flanders, a similar project covers the Antwerp area. 39 As stated in 
the introduction, the exploration of these new digital sources has led to a 
strong focus on the period from 1850 to 1940. 
 Using linkages between records and reconstructed life courses, historical 
demographers are increasingly able to study demographic events (mar-
riages, births, migrations and deaths) in terms of the preceding  processes. 
 These processes of, respectively, family formation, adjustment to labour 
market opportunities, and health and ageing are being deconstructed into 
their component factors and sub-processes. Understanding demographic 
outcomes means understanding how the economic resources of households 
constrain or enable people in terms of the choices they make (for instance 
to marry or to migrate), how culture sets normative parameters or ‘life 
scripts’ for these choices (and in doing so expands or limits the leeway for 
individual agency), 40 and how the environment (ecological, infrastructural, 
economic, etc.) interacts with individual capacities to realise life plans. 
Many studies have emerged, showing on the one hand notable diffferences 
between regions, religious groups and social classes, and on the other 
hand, huge individual-level variation within these regions, groups and 
classes. Researchers are still struggling to come to grips with these two 
forms of variation. Currently, effforts are being made to move forward and 
to propose models to explain variations in individual and group demo-
graphic outcomes. The fĳ irst approach is to design large comparative studies, 
38 For an overview of studies using the Historical Sample of the Netherlands, see Jan Kok, Kees 
Mandemakers and Hilde Bras, ‘Van geboortebank Sample tot  collaboratory . Een ref lectie op 
twintig jaar dataverzameling en onderzoek met de HSN’,  Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische 
Geschiedenis 6 (2009) 3-36.
39 Koen Matthijs and Sarah Moreels, ‘The Antwerp COR*-database: A unique Flemish source 
for historical-demographic research’,  The History of the Family. An International Quarterly  15 
(2010) 109-115.
40 See the special issue on historical research on cultural life scripts,  Historical Social Research 
 2014, guest editors O. Boonstra, H. Bras and M. Derks.
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spanning long periods and studying variation using the same categories 
and techniques, in diffferent ecological and economic settings. The other 
approach is to search for the ‘bottom line’ in variation, 41 or to determine to 
what extent demographic behaviour is transmitted, either from the parents 
or in the form of behavioural traits that have emerged during the evolution 
of the human race. An example is the notion that humans will always 
strive for successful offfspring, as previously detailed. By understanding the 
transmitted element in behaviour, demographers can move on to unravel 
the interplay between contextual constraints and individual choices. In 
the remainder of this section, I discuss some examples of these approaches, 
again without any claim to completeness. 
 An example of the fĳ irst approach is the study of social class diffferentials 
in adult mortality. This has been on the agenda since the middle of the 
nineteenth century, when, among others, Friedrich Engels claimed that 
industrialisation and capitalist exploitation worsened the living conditions 
of the poor. In this period, epidemics were receding, making individual 
fĳ itness and resistance more important factors in mortality. According to 
the ‘pessimists’, the increasing gap in living standards during industrialisa-
tion leads to stronger social-class gradients in mortality. In the later stage 
of modernisation, the gap is believed to become smaller again. Others, 
however, suggest a more constant social-class gradient, as the socially 
advantaged will always be more able to translate their power and income 
into better health (in the present day in the form of a healthier life style). 
In a recent comparative project covering four centuries in urban and rural 
settings in Canada, Switzerland, Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands and the 
United States, these hypotheses have been tested using the same class 
scheme and the same methods. 42 The outcomes refute both the ‘pessimist’ 
hypothesis on increased diffferences during industrialisation and the 
‘constancy’ hypothesis. No increase was found in social class diffferences, 
at least not related to industrialisation. Increases that did occur were linked 
to urbanisation and population density, and in some areas took place well 
before the Industrial Revolution. Mainly after 1900, social class diffferences 
receded. In the Netherlands, mortality diffferences were rather strong among 
young adults (aged 17-35) born between 1850 and 1882. In that cohort, semi-
skilled workers fared rather poorly compared with other social groups.   43 
41 Low,  Why sex matters , 142.
42 Published in the special issue (Tommy Bengtsson and Frans van Poppel eds.), Socioeconomic 
inequalities in death,  Explorations in Economic History 48 (2011).
43 Tommy Bengtsson and Frans van Poppel, ‘Socioeconomic inequalities in death from past 
to present: An introduction’,  Explorations in Economic History  48 (2011) 343-356.
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 In the second approach to understanding diversity, we can discern 
several strands. These range from testing ideas from evolutionary biology 
or setting up research designs to uncover intergenerational transmission, 
to linking genealogical family trees with DNA samples taken from descend-
ants. 
 In recent studies, the relevance of evolved human traits for understand-
ing (historical) demographic behaviour has been tested. One example is 
the notion that the human race stands out compared with other animals by 
the role the kin group plays in rearing children. It has been suggested that 
through evolution, women have developed a relatively early menopause 
in order to help their daughters with raising children. 44 The notion of co-
operative breeding or the ‘grandmother hypothesis’ has been tested using 
data from several villages, studies in developing countries and historical 
family reconstitutions. 45 Overall, maternal grandmothers appear the most 
reliable ‘helpers at the nest’. In fact, even in a modern, industrialised country 
such as the Netherlands, care given by grandmothers stimulates their 
daughters’ fertility. 46 At the moment, research is focused on how diffferent 
types of kin, either co-resident or not, are helpful in keeping children alive, 
or in stimulating fertility. 47 
 There are at least fĳ ive pathways that may explain the intergenerational 
inheritance of demographic behaviour. These are: primary socialisation, 
parental control, the inheritance of resources, shared environment, and 
the transmission of genetically-based traits. In their fĳ irst years, children 
learn mainly from their parents, in particular the mother. This process of 
learning typically occurs without any conscious efffort. When learned ideas 
come to be perceived as personal, freely-chosen points of view, this primary 
socialisation leads to conformity between parents and children. 48 Second, 
behavioural conformity can also be the result of control by the parents, 
44 For an overview of the literature, see Jan Beise and Eckart Voland, ‘A multilevel event history 
analysis of the efffect of grandmothers on child mortality in a historical German population 
(Krummhorn, Ostfriesland, 1720-1874)’  Demographic Research  7 (2002) 469-498.
45 For an excellent overview, see Rebecca Sear and David Coall, ‘How much does family matter? 
Cooperative breeding and the demographic transition’,  PDR  37 (2011) 81-112.
46 Ralf Kaptijn, Fleur Thomese, Theo van Tilburg and Aart C. Liefbroer, ‘How grandparents 
matter. Support for the cooperative breeding hypothesis in a contemporary Dutch population’, 
 Human Nature  21 (2010) 393-405.
47 See, for instance, the research project The Power of the Family (Hilde Bras),  http://www.
ru.nl/hlcs/programma’s/public-and-private/the-socio-cultural/related-projects/the-power-the-
family/ .
48 See for a more extensive explanation, Jan van Bavel and Jan Kok, ‘Social control and the 
intergenerational transmission of the age at marriage, rural Holland 1850-1940’,  Population-E , 
64 (2009) 343-360 .
TSEG2014.2.indd   251 24-06-14   10:52
252
TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR SOCIALE EN ECONOMISCHE GESCHIEDENIS
VOL. 11, NO. 2, 2014
and may occur even without the internalisation of the norms upheld by the 
parents. Third, resemblance in demographic behaviour between parents 
and children can result from sharing social status characteristics – for 
instance economic resources – that influence behaviour in both genera-
tions. Fourth, in the absence of migration, both generations share the same 
environment, and face to some extent the same economic and ecological 
constraints. Finally, the inheritance of genes may also lead to similarities 
between parents and children. These may include innate diseases, but 
also personality traits. Clearly, it is very difffĳ icult to separate the diffferent 
influences of resources, environment, socialisation, discipline and genes 
in the intergenerational transmission of behaviour. 
 This recent attention to generations has enriched several fĳ ields, among 
others the study of infant and child mortality. Increasingly, scholars have 
become aware that early-life mortality was often clustered in families. In 
other words, a relatively large proportion of all deaths occurred in a rela-
tively small number of families. To understand properly the trends and local 
variation in infant mortality we need to know more about this phenomenon. 
Factors that may account for the clustering include the mother (her age, 
fecundity, inherited genetic disorders, disease profĳile, level of education, 
training in hygiene and breastfeeding habits), the household (income and 
composition) and the community (ecology and disease environment). 49 For 
the Netherlands, a recent study has shown that infant death clustering was 
unevenly spread, being very strong in the province of Zeeland. Further, the 
study revealed that part of the explanation lies in the competition between 
young children for care, attention and resources within households. The 
mother’s health was also important, which was indicated by a strong asso-
ciation between stillbirths and infant mortality; if a mother has poor health, 
she has more births with low gestational ages and low birth weights. 50 To 
their surprise, Janssens and B. Pelzer were able to attribute infant deaths in 
Enschede and Tilburg completely to the ‘usual suspects’ such as twin births, 
the preceding birth interval and the age of the mother. Therefore, there 
appears to be limited explanatory space for bad childrearing practices, at 
least in these cities. 51 Finally, working on data for the nineteenth-century 
49 See Sören Edvinsson and Angélique Janssens, ‘Clustering of deaths in families: infant and 
child mortality in historical perspective’,  Biodemography and social biology 58 (2012) 75-86.
50 Frans van Poppel, Govert Bijwaard, Peter Ekamper and Kees Mandemakers, ’Historical 
trends in the correlation of sibling deaths in infancy in The Netherlands’,  Biodemography and 
Social Biology 58 (2012) 87-115.
51 Angélique Janssens and Ben Pelzer, ‘Did factory girls make bad mothers? Women’s labor 
market experience, motherhood, and children’s mortality risks in the past’,  Biodemography and 
Social Biology 58 (2012) 2, 133-148.
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Antwerp population, M. Vandezande and K. Matthijs found that death 
clustering is truly transmitted across the generations. If a mother had lost 
many siblings, she was more likely to lose children herself, even when all 
other factors were controlled for. 52 
 The literature shows that the strength and pathways of intergenerational 
transmission difffer by context, sub-group and period. Fascinatingly, the 
efffects generally become stronger in the more recent period. The more social 
pressure on behaviour recedes and the more individual autonomy is present, 
the stronger the similarities between the generations become. This indicates 
that there is a greater possibility to achieve (socialised) preferences. 53 In 
the Low Countries, in addition to mortality the role of intergenerational 
transmission has been documented for fertility, 54 age at marriage 55 and 
adolescent height. 56 We can expect this fĳ ield to expand, for instance through 
research designs comparing the demographic fates of siblings. 
 Finally, until recently genes have worked as a ‘black box’ in transmission 
research by historical demographers. Conversely, geneticists often faced 
problems in determining the long-term impact of specifĳ ic chromosomes 
and in controlling for social factors. Interdisciplinary projects in which 
both disciplines join forces and DNA is taken from the descendants of 
specifĳ ic groups of interests (for instance very old people) offfer a promising 
way forward. 57 
52 Mattijs Vandezande and Koenraad Matthijs, ‘Inherited dimensions of infant mortality. 
Detecting signs of disproportionate mortality risks in successive generations,  The History of 
the Family  18  (2013) 169-186.
53 Mike Murphy, The intergenerational transmission of reproductive behaviour: comparative 
perspective,  The History of the Family  18 ( 2013) 107-115.
54 Hilde Bras, Jan van Bavel and Kees Mandemakers, ‘Unraveling the intergenerational 
transmission of fertility: genetic and shared-environment efffects during the demographic 
transition in the Netherlands, 1810-1910’,  The History of the Family 18 (2013) 116-134.
55 Frans Van Poppel, Christiaan Monden and Kees Mandemakers, ‘Marriage timing over the 
generations’,  Human Nature, 19(2008)7), 7-22.
56 George Alter and Michel Oris, Efffects of Inheritance and Environment on the Heights of 
Brothers in Nineteenth-Century Belgium,  Human Nature 19 (2008) 44-55.
57 John Hobcraft, ‘The ABC of demographic behaviour: How the interplay of alleles, brains, 
and contexts over the life course should shape research aimed at understanding population 
processes’,  Population Studies , 60 (2006) 153-187; Maarten Larmuseau, Anneleen van Gestelen, 
Mannis van Oven and Ronny Decorte, ’Genetic genealogy comes of age ‒ Perspectives on the 
use of deep-rooted pedigrees in human population genetics’,  American Journal of Physical 
Anthropology 150 (2013) 505-511.
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 Understanding regional persistence 
 We have seen that historical demographers work hard to break down ag-
gregated demographic patterns into highly context-specifĳ ic behaviour. 
Behavioural variation is traced at the level of the individuals, their ances-
tors and families, and their social groups. However, simultaneously we 
see an increased interest in demographic similarity across broad regions. 
Discussions have intensifĳ ied on how to classify such regions, where to look 
for the origins of their commonality and how to interpret the persistence 
of demographic traits. Such macro regions are often described in terms 
of ‘family systems’. A family system can be seen as the cultural mould 
shaping (family) relations and demographic behaviour. There are several 
reasons for this renewed interest in family systems. First, the intensifĳ ied 
global co-operation of scholars (in which the Internet plays a major role) 
has led to an increase in comparative studies. For these studies, the notion 
of family systems serves as a good starting point to examine diffferences in, 
for example, age at marriage, leaving home, or mortality, and relate these to 
hierarchical relations between family members. 58 In the Netherlands, the 
concept is being used to connect regional variation in terms of co-residence 
and inheritance to demographic diffferences. 59 Second, for New Institutional 
Economics, family relations and demographic norms are among the histori-
cal institutions to be incorporated in models explaining the pathways of 
economic growth. 60 In addition, family systems have been linked to the 
emergence of other institutions, such as pension systems, 61 and they are 
related to the position of women and the global diffferences in their relative 
58 E.g. Michel Oris and Emiko Ochiai, ‘Family crisis in the context of diffferent family systems’, 
in: Renzo Derosas and Michel Oris (eds.),  When dad died. Individuals and families coping with 
distress in past societies  (Bern 2002) 17-79; Theo Engelen and Arthur P. Wolf (eds.),  Marriage 
and the Family in Eurasia. Perspectives on the Hajnal hypothesis (Amsterdam 2005); Noriko O. 
Tsuya, Feng Wang, George Alter and James Z. Lee (eds.),  Prudence and pressure. Reproduction 
and human agency in Europe and Asia, 1700-1900  (Cambridge Mass 2010).
59 For example, Bianca Suanet and Hilde Bras, ‘De plek in de kinderrij. Geboortepositie en 
huwelijkstiming in vijf Nederlandse provincies, 1840-1922’, in: Koen Matthijs, Jan Kok and Hilde 
Bras (eds.), Leren van historische levenslopen (Leuven 2012) 181-198.
60 For example, Gilles Duranton, Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and Richard Sandall, ‘Family types 
and the persistence of regional disparities in Europe’,  Economic Geography,  85 (2009) 23-47.
61 Vincent Galasso and Paola Profeta, When the state mirrors the family. The design of pension 
systems. CESIFO Working Paper 3191(2010). For a more general discussion of the relation to 
welfare systems, Pier P. Viazzo, ‘Family, kinship and welfare provision in Europe, past and 
present: commonalities and divergences’,  Continuity and Change  25 (2010) 137-159.
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‘agency’. 62 Finally, demographers are debating the extent and rate at which 
the world is showing convergence in demographic behaviour. The answer is 
of vital importance for making proper forecasts of population growth. Lower 
speeds of convergence or even divergent patterns are often attributed to the 
ongoing influence of culture and tradition, defying reduction to variables 
such as economic growth or urbanisation. 63 
 To date, however, no agreement has been reached on what these family 
systems actually are. Depending on the type of family norms and practices 
considered most important, diffferent authors have created diffferent typolo-
gies. The typology created by J. Hajnal was highly influential on subsequent 
research. Hajnal was the fĳ irst to show that compared with the rest of the 
world, family formation in Northwest Europe was characterised by late 
and infrequent marriage. 64 In relation to late marriage, the area stood out 
with regard to the temporary period of serving in diffferent households 
(lifecycle service) and neolocal household formation. Another rather influ-
ential typology, based on the combination of co-residence and inheritance 
practices, has been developed by E. Todd. 65 In his view, family systems stand 
for persistent elementary inter-personal relationships, which are transmit-
ted from one generation to the next and form the foundations for global 
variation in attitudes towards equality and authority. Partible inheritance 
means equality among siblings, at least among brothers, whereas impart-
ibility sets one favoured child apart from the others. Authoritarian family 
systems prescribe the co-residence of married children with their parents 
(stem or joint families), whereas in non-authoritarian systems, the neolocal 
residence of married couples is the preferred pattern. Based on diffferences 
in kinship ties, D. Reher has sketched ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ family systems in 
respectively Northwest and Southern Europe. 66  
 Labelling and contrasting whole regions has been attacked from many 
sides. Some scholars have stated that the abundant local variation in de-
mography discredits the notion of macro-regional family systems. Others 
have stated the opposite, by suggesting that the historical and contemporary 
variation in kin co-residence is basically a function of the share of agriculture 
62 Karen O. Mason, ‘Gender and Family Systems in the Fertility Transition’,  PDR , 27 (2001) 
160-176; Göran Therborn,  Between sex and power. Family in the world, 1900-2000 . London 2004); 
http://www.cgeh.nl/agency-project.
63 A good discussion of the time layers involved in global convergence is Göran Therborn,  The 
world. A beginner’s guide (Cambridge 2011).
64 John Hajnal, ‘Two kinds of pre-industrial household formation systems’,  PDR  8 (1982) 449-
494.
65 In several books, among which Emmanuel Todd,  L’Invention de l’Europe (Paris 1990).
66 David S. Reher, ‘Family ties in Western Europe: Persistent Contrasts’,  PDR , 24 (1998) 203-234.
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in the economy. 67 Some have rejected thinking in terms of family systems 
for having deep traditionalist and orientalist roots. 68 Recently, Hajnal’s 
well-known European Marriage Pattern, with its demarcation line running 
from Trieste to Saint Petersburg, has been dubbed a ‘still-born typology 
which will no doubt stand out as the greatest contribution of the Cold War 
to anthropology’. 69 
 Despite being hotly debated, research into family systems will remain 
on the agenda for the foreseeable future. However, many things are still 
unclear. First, it proves difffĳ icult to defĳ ine the essential characteristics of 
family systems – co-residence patterns, inheritance rule or kin ties – let 
alone to come up with good historical indicators. Second, and under-
standably, the origins of family systems are sought in diffferent directions. 
Some scholars focus on the impact of the Black Death on women’s labour 
participation to explain late marriage in Europe, 70 whilst others put more 
emphasis on the early medieval spread of Roman Catholicism and the 
manorial system. 71 Some even go back to the Bronze Age to explain global 
variation in family types. 72 Finally, we need to know how it is possible that 
ancient regional diffferences in family types can still exert influence on 
current social relations and economic performance. Diffferent pathways are 
conceivable. First, as the family is the locus of primary socialisation, we can 
imagine that (implicit) norms regarding intra-familial relations, ideas of the 
relative value of boys and girls, obligations towards family, etc., are passed 
on from one generation to the next. Second, traditional rules – even when 
now extinct – for co-residence and inheritance have shaped the networks 
of extended kin that operate as support systems or ‘communicating com-
munities’ and still inf luence couples’ decision making. Indeed, the size 
and quality of the internal relationships of such networks difffer strongly 
across Europe 73 , as well as within countries, which has been demonstrated 
67 Steven Ruggles, ‘ Reconsidering the Northwest European Family System ’,  PDR 35 (2009) 
249-273.
68 E.g. Mikolaj Szoltysek, The genealogy of Eastern European diffference: an insider’s view. 
MPIDR Working Paper 2011-014.
69 Emmanuel Todd,  L’origine des systèmes familiaux , Vol. 1 ( L’Eurasie ), (Paris 2011) 48.
70 Tine de Moor and Jan Luiten van Zanden,’ Girl power: the European marriage pattern and 
labour markets in the North Sea region in the late medieval and early modern period’,  The 
Economic History Review  63 (2010) 1-33.
71 Michael Mitterauer,  Why Europe? The medieval origins of its special path  (Chicago 2010).
72 Todd,  L’origine des systèmes familiaux .
73 See, Patrick Heady and Martin Kohli (eds.),  Family, kinship and state in contemporary Europe. 
 Vol.3 Perspectives on theory and practice  (Frankfurt/New York 2010).
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for the Netherlands. 74 Lastly, and as already mentioned, family systems 
in the past may have stimulated the emergence (or lack thereof) of other 
social or political institutions that have shaped the developmental path of 
a particular region up to the present day. 
 Epilogue  
 In the above sections, I have discussed topics within historical demography, 
currently of interest to its practitioners in the Netherlands and Belgium 
(although I have concentrated on Flanders). Apart from an ongoing inter-
est in the demographic transition, I have observed new explorations of 
individual demographic variability, using methods including looking at 
mechanisms of intergenerational transmission. Further, there is a renewed 
interest in the ‘institutional’ characteristics of the family and the way in 
which family norms and patterns have afffected economic developments 
in the long term. 
 In this epilogue, I would like to take an overview of the fĳ ield and answer 
the question of what historical demography in or of the Low Countries 
brings to the world at large. In my opinion, the Low Countries have three 
things to offfer. First, the  demographic histories of our countries, being 
densely populated, urbanised, commercialised, and with a strong emphasis 
on nuclear families, provide a specifĳ ic perspective to the debates about 
when and how fertility declined and when and how specifĳ ic diseases lost 
their grip on children and adults. In addition, the contrast between early 
(in Belgium) and late (in the Netherlands) industrialisation is of interest 
with regard to the ongoing discussions about how societal ‘modernisation’ 
afffected geographic mobility, careers, partner choice, the timing of marriage 
and opting for a smaller family size. The Netherlands, in addition, stands 
out in terms of religious diversity and competition, offfering insights into 
the interplay between religion, social control and demography. 75  
 Second, the Low Countries stand out due to exceptionally  rich and ac-
cessible sources . The population registers (started in Belgium in 1846 and 
74 Hilde Bras and Theo van Tilburg, ‘Kinship and social networks. A regional analysis of sibling 
relations in twentieth-century Netherlands’,  Journal of Family History 32 (2007) 296-322.
75 For a more extensive discussion of the specifĳ ic Low Countries perspective to demography, 
see Koen Matthijs, Jan Kok, Theo Engelen, Frans van Poppel and Kees Mandemakers, ‘A turn of 
fate. Life courses in the Low Countries between 1850 and 1940’. Working Paper WOG/HD/2006, 
http://soc.kuleuven.be/ceso/historischedemografĳ ie/resources/pdf/WOG%20working%20
paper01.pdf
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in The Netherlands in 1850) are a virtual gold mine. These registers offfer 
the possibility to trace individual people from one demographic event (for 
instance migration) to the next (for instance marriage), and to determine 
the causes and consequences of behavioural choices. Not surprisingly, the 
innovative use of life courses and ‘event history analysis’ to shed new light 
on demographic processes was pioneered with the use of Belgian data. 76 The 
Historical Sample of the Netherlands became one of the leading historical 
databases in the world, precisely by exploiting the research potential of the 
population registers. In both countries, other sources are being opened up 
for scholarly research. For instance, Dutch census records have been made 
available on the Internet 77 and they are currently the subject of a project 
to use semantic web technology to enhance their usability even further. 78 
Dutch records on birth, death and marriage will soon be linked using clever 
algorithms allowing automatic family reconstitutions. 79 In Belgium, the civil 
records of entire provinces are being digitised in crowd-sourcing projects. 80 
Further, municipal information on the economy and population is being 
provided on the web, including Geographic Information Systems applica-
tions to visualise spatial variation. 81 These are just a few examples from a 
host of initiatives that put historical demography at the forefront of the 
digital humanities and e-research.  
 Third, Low Countries’ historical demographers are exemplary in their 
exceptionally  strong interdisciplinary co-operation . The (Leuven-based) 
Scientifĳic Research Network Historical Demography brings together sociolo-
gists, demographers, historians and bio-statisticians in Belgium and the 
Netherlands, resulting in the sharing of data, working on joint publications, 
exploring new methods and training new generations of practitioners. 82  
 There may be a downside to all this. Focusing on the richest (nineteenth 
and early twentieth century) sources and the smartest ways to explore them 
may divert attention from earlier periods and from qualitative sources. 
However, I am confĳident that the balance will be restored, and that the 
gains made in the past decade – in terms of data, skills, interdisciplinary 
networks and international outreach – will be consolidated. 
76 George Alter,  Family and the female life course. The women of Verviers, Belgium , 1849-1880 
(Madison 1988).
77 http://www.volkstellingen.nl/nl/.
78  http://www.cedar-project.nl 
79  http://www.iisg.nl/hsn/news/links-project.php 
80 E.g.  http://www.familiekunde-brussel.be/ 
81 http://www.hisstat.be/.
82 http://soc.kuleuven.be/ceso/historischedemografĳ ie/eng/index.html.
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